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INTRODUCTION
RICHARD

H.

MCADAMS*

Criminal law plays an integral role in the history of American
race relations; race is a constant theme in American criminal procedure. The literature on the intersection of race and criminal justice is
now so vast and the issues so numerous,' that I do not think a truly
brief introduction is possible or necessary. I will instead provide a
practical overview of the articles in this symposium and then discuss
some common themes the articles illustrate. The authors are (other
than myself) distinguished scholars in criminal law or procedure; each
was offered the opportunity to write on any subject of his or her
choosing within the symposium topic. Together, the papers provide
an excellent commentary on many of the current issues concerning
race and criminal law.
In Batson Ethics for Prosecutors and Trial Judges,2 Sheri Lynn
Johnson explains how conscientious prosecutors and trial judges may
effectively implement the ban on race-based peremptory challenges.
* Professor, Boston University School of Law.
1. Recent books within the general topic include DAVID C. ANDERSON, CRIME AND THE
POLITICS OF HYSTERIA: How THE WILLIE HORTON STORY CHANGED AMERICAN JUSTICE
(1995); E.M. BECK AND STEWART E. TOLNAY, A FESTIVAL OF VIOLENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF
SOUTHERN LYNCHINGS, 1882-1930 (1995); MARVIN W. DULANEY, BLACK POLICE IN AMERICA
(1996); ETHNIcrry, RACE, AND CRIME: PERSPECTIVES ACROSS TIME AND PLACE (Darnell F.
Hawkins ed. 1996); RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW (1997); JEROME G.
MILLER, SEARCH AND DESTROY: AFRICAN-AMERICAN

MALES IN

THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYS-

(1996); ERIC W. RISE, THE MARTINSVILLE SEVEN: RACE, RAPE, AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1995); MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECr-RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA (1995); MARYANNE VOLLERS, GHOSTS OF MISSISSIPPI: THE MURDER OP MEDGAR
TEM

EVERS, THE TRIALS OF BYRON DE LA BECKWITH, AND THE HAUNTING OF THE NEW SOUTH

(1995).
Obviously, journal articles are even more abundant. Here is a small sampling of recent
unpublished empirical papers: John M. Conley, et. al., The Impact of Race and Class of the
Accused on Jury Decision-Making (1997) (reporting that mock juries were more likely to convict
white defendants); John J. Donohue III & Steven D. Levitt, The Impact of Race on Policing,
Arrest Patterns, and Crime (1997) (studying how the racial composition of a police force affects
the racial pattern of arrests and crime); Franklin Gilliam Jr. & Shanto Iyengar, Prime Suspects:
Script-Based Reasoning About Race and Crime (1997) (reporting that 42% of subjects who
viewed a staged news report of a crime recalled the suspect's race when none was provided; 90%
of the false recollections were of African-American or Hispanic perpetrators); David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic and Gender Disparities in Sentencing: Evidence from the U.S. Federal
Courts (1998) (finding that, on average and controlling for criminological factors, federal judges
give blacks sentences that are six months longer than whites, due mostly to departures from the
guidelines).
2. Sheri Lynn Johnson, Batson Ethics for Prosecutors and Trial Court Judges, 73 CHI.KENT L. REv. 475 (1998).
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She begins by observing a disturbing anomaly: prosecutors do not
seem to treat their Batson3 obligations as seriously as they treat other
constitutional obligations favoring defendants. Professor Johnson
traces this problem to a failure in Supreme Court opinion writing: by
only condemning the previously accepted practice of racial strikes,
Batson and its progeny provide no practical guide to what kind of
strikes are legitimate. 4 Worse, later cases blur the rationale of Batson
by shifting the focus from the defendant's right at trial to a citizen's
right to jury service. As a result, she contends, even well-motivated
prosecutors and trial judges treat the Batson obligation as a narrow
and technical rule requiring only a plausible non-race reason for exercising a strike.5 Courts therefore permit prosecutors to justify strikes
by factors that are highly correlated with and barely distinguishable
from race. Addressing herself to conscientious prosecutors and trial
judges, Professor Johnson articulates a broader vision of the Batson
obligation and provides a concrete ethical standard for assessing when
6
a strike violates that obligation.
Nancy King raises the Batson issue in an entirely different context
in Batson for the Bench? Regulating the Peremptory Challenges of
Judges.7 Over a dozen states grant prosecutors and defendants a right
to strike one judge assigned to their case without providing a specific
reason. 8 Other jurisdictions routinely debate whether to create such a
right. Professor King doubts the wisdom of the judicial peremptory
challenge and raises, in particular, the danger that parties will exercise
the right based on the judge's race. 9 She evaluates this danger in light
of existing empirical data and considers how Batson might apply to
limit race-based judicial strikes, including the issue of who would have
standing in this context to raise such a Batson claim. 10
In Race and the Victim: An Examination of Capital Sentencing
and Guilt-Attribution Studies," Cynthia Lee discusses studies finding
that a crime victim's race affects the prosecutor's decision to seek, and
the jury's decision to recommend, the death penalty. The most well
3. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
4. See id. at 482-85.
5. See id. at 485-88.
6. See id. at 500-07.
7. Nancy J. King, Batson for the Bench? Regulating the Peremptory Challenge of Judges, 73
CHI.-KETrr L. REV. 509 (1998).
8. See RICHARD E. FLmmi, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION 765-839 (1996).
9. See King, supra note 7, at 511.
10. See id. at 511-18, 524-32.
11. Cynthia K.Y. Lee, Race and the Victim: An Examinationof CapitalSentencing and Guilt
Attribution Studies, 73 CHI.-KEr L. REV. 533 (1998).
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known of these is undoubtedly the Baldus study, 12 which provided the
data underlying the defendant's challenge to the Georgia death penalty regime in McCleskey v. Kemp. 13 Less well known are empirical
analyses conducted since the Supreme Court rejected McCleskey's
challenge. Professor Lee reviews these studies, virtually all of which
find that the victim's race continues to matter in death penalty sentencing. 14 She also reviews experiments on jury decisionmaking in
non-capital cases, which reach conflicting results on the significance of
juror-victim racial similarity and guilt attribution. Although an experimental design allows researchers to hold constant every variable
other than race, Professor Lee notes that the juries in these experiments often differ significantly from real world juries, thereby limiting
the confidence one may have in the applicability of those results
outside the laboratory. 15 She concludes by noting where additional
study would be useful.
In Objective Tests and Subjective Bias: Some Problems of Discriminatory Intent in the CriminalLaw,' 6 Andrew Leipold comprehensively surveys criminal procedure doctrines for their effect on efforts
to eradicate race discrimination in the criminal system. He observes
an interesting anomaly: objective tests predominate except in the case
of equal protection doctrine. Professor Leipold discusses, for example, the recent Supreme Court holding that the subjective motive of a
police officer is irrelevant to determining the reasonableness of his
actions for Fourth Amendment purposes, 17 as well as the long-standing rule preventing the use of juror testimony to impeach the deliberations of a jury. 18 Professor Leipold explains how such rules, though
advancing judicial economy, make it more difficult to detect and eradicate impermissible race-based decisionmaking in criminal law. Contrary rules in a variety of areas could either facilitate or obviate the
difficult proof of purposeful discrimination required by equal protection doctrine. Given these limitations, Professor Leipold proposes
12. See David C. Baldus, Georgia Woodworth & Charles A. Pulaski, Jr., ComparativeReview of Death Sentences: An EmpiricalStudy of the George Experience, 74 J. CQuM. L. & CRIMI.
NOLOGY 661 (1983).
13. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
14. See Lee, supra note 11, at 538-42.
15. See id. at 542-57.
16. Andrew D. Leipold, Objective Tests and Subjective Bias: Some Problems of Discriminatory Intent in the Criminal Law, 73 CHi.-KENrr L. REv. 559 (1998).
17. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
18. See, e.g., FED. R. EviD. 606(b); Leipold, supra note 16, at n.93.
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and evaluates some alternative solutions including improved collection of relevant data and class action civil rights suits. 19
My contribution is Race and Selective Prosecution: Discovering
the Pitfalls of Armstrong.20 In United States v. Armstrong,2 1 the
Supreme Court held that trial judges may not grant a defendant discovery on a selective prosecution claim unless the defendant first provides evidence that the government failed to prosecute similarly
situated offenders of another race. I criticize this rule for several reasons. First, the Court overestimates the ability of defendants who are
targeted on account of race to meet this standard. Defendants with
meritorious claims will be unable to find unprosecuted offenders, for
example, when the offense occurs in private and the selectivity takes
the form of nonenforcement against members of other races. 22 Second, the Court fails to create an appropriate test because it does not
discuss generally what facts are necessary to establish that race and
the decision to prosecute are correlated. The Court seems unaware
that the evidence it requires is not sufficient to demonstrate a correlation, yet extending the Armstrong standard to all evidence necessary
for a correlation would prevent discovery in virtually any case. In
contrast, I describe an alternative test that would be sensitive to all
facts relevant to a correlation but would not prove insurmountable for
defendants with meritorious claims.2 3 Finally, I respond to two criticisms of selective prosecution doctrine that might justify Armstrong:
one, that there is little or no racially selective prosecution and, two,
that victims of selective prosecution do not actually deserve the remedy of dismissal. 24 Upon analysis, I find neither claim persuasive.
In Place and Crime,2 5 Tracey Meares develops a sociology of
crime and crime control based on social organization theory. She follows Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay 2 6 in emphasizing the importance of community structure-features of place-to crime. On this
view, the strength of formal and informal social networks significantly
19. See Leipold, supra note 16, at Part IV.
20. Richard H. McAdams, Race and Selective Prosecution:Discovering the Pitfalls of Armstrong, 73 CH.-KENT L. REV. 605 (1998).

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996).
See McAdams, supra note 20, at x.
See id. at 634-40.
See id. at 642-66.
Tracey L. Meares, Place and Crime, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 669 (1998).

26.

See, e.g., CLIFFORD R. SHAw & HENRY D. McKAY, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND UR-

BAN AREAS (1969). More recent proponents include Robert Sampson and William Julius Wilson.
See, e.g. Robert J. Sampson & William Julius Wilson, Toward a Theory of Race, Crime, and
Urban Inequality, in CRIME AND INEQUALITY 46 (J. Hagan and R. Peterson eds., 1995).
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affects the level of crime in a place independent of other factors such
as state enforcement or poverty. Professor Meares uses this theory to
examine the claims of two groups of criminal law scholars she terms
the "Skeptics" and the "Cheerleaders. '27 Law and Order Cheerleaders emphasize the importance of individual incentives to commit
criminal acts and the ability of government to affect those incentives
through rigorous law enforcement. Law Enforcement Skeptics emphasize the racial discrimination present in law enforcement and question the legitimacy and effectiveness of enforcement as a solution to
crime. Professor Meares critiques each view, arguing that Skeptics
underestimate the importance of law enforcement but that Cheerleaders ignore the way that government enforcement, depending on
its form, can either enhance or undermine the community structures
that are crucial to crime control.28 She uses social organization theory
to evaluate particular enforcement strategies, rejecting, for example,
severe sanctions for nonviolent offenders but defending "reverse stings" and juvenile curfews, in each case based on their effect on com29
munity structures.
The authors were not confined to particular issues and the coverage is fairly broad. Most of the important criminal law institutions
receive some treatment. Professors Leipold and Meares, for example,
discuss the police; Professor Leipold and I discuss prosecutors; Professors Johnson and Lee focus on juries and jury selection; Professor
King discusses the role of the judge and judicial selection. Despite
these disparate topics and approaches, however, some common
themes emerge. I will describe three.
First, the articles illustrate the importance of social science to understanding matters of race and criminal law. Empirical techniques
are necessary to estimate the degree to which the system or its components are discriminatory, a starting point for most of the issues under
discussion. 30 Two articles, however, deserve particular mention. Professor Lee provides what social science disciplines term a "literature
review," a reflective analysis of a growing body of empirical work.
27. Meares, supra note 25, at 670-71.
28. See id. at 677-94.
29. See id. at 694-701.
30. See King, supra note 7, at 515-18 (discussing empirical study on the use of judicial peremptories); Leipold, supra note 16, at Part IV.B.1 (calling for more careful collection of data on
the racial impact of various law enforcement decisions); McAdams, supra note 20, at 642-52
(relying on social science data concerning discriminatory attitudes, discrimination in private markets, and discrimination by prosecutors). My article also criticizes the Supreme Court's decision
in Armstrong for failing to understand the rudiments of correlation. See McAdams, supra note
20, at 625-34.
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Reviews seem particularly important for legal analysis because most
lawyers are not trained in social science, though we routinely assert
and rely upon empirical claims. In addition, Professor Meares' article
is very ambitious in its use of social science, as it defends a sociological
theory of crime and applies the theory to contemporary law enforcement issues. In this manner, she demonstrates how sociology is relevant not only to criminal behavior but to criminal law, as the
constitutional analysis of various enforcement practices should include
an understanding of their likely consequences.
Second, several papers struggle to bring to the surface the complex cost-benefit analysis that necessarily underlies decisions in this
area. For example, I contend that the issue in Armstrong-the appropriate discovery standard in a selective prosecution case-should be
explicitly viewed as a problem of minimizing the costs of false positives and false negatives, that is, of the costs of granting discovery to
defendants asserting non-meritorious claims and the costs of denying
discovery to defendants asserting meritorious claims. Professor
Meares describes the benefits as well as costs of imprisonment in an
article intended to complicate and enrich the cost-benefit analysis of
law enforcement strategies. More generally, Professor Leipold concedes that a judiciary concerned with administrative costs may in good
faith favor legal tests focusing on objective facts, even as he criticizes
such rules for making discrimination harder to detect and uproot. The
explicit inclusion of "costs" in the analysis might seem to favor the
government's view of the doctrinal issues, but often it does not.
Rather, scrutinizing matters of cost sometimes exposes weaknesses in
the government's analysis.
Finally, the articles propose solutions through institutions other
than appellate courts. More commonly, legal scholarship focuses on
appellate courts, if not as the intended audience, then at least as the
appropriate institution to implement reform. Some of the work in this
symposium, including my own, falls into this mode. Several contributors, however, look elsewhere for solutions. Professor Meares advocates making law enforcement strategies sensitive to social
organization and therefore focuses on institutions such as police and
the church. She ends her article, for example, by describing informal
community-police cooperation including one notable instance where
Chicago police escorted prayer groups to street corners usually occupied by drug dealers.3 1 Professor Johnson identifies a problem in ap31.

See Meares, supra note 25, at 702-04.
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pellate court analysis of Batson, but proposes as a solution an ethical
standard for prosecutors and an enforcement test for trial courts. Professor King writes, in part, to diminish legislative enthusiasm for judicial peremptory strikes and Professor Leipold calls for legislation to
improve data gathering on race and law enforcement.
In sum, the articles provide an interesting variety of scholarly perspectives on the difficult subject of race and criminal law.

